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Abstract 
Platform businesses add value by facilitating interactions between customers who 
are attracted in part by network externalities.  Two-sided platform businesses with 
low costs of reversing participation status have become more important with the 
rise of the internet.  This essay is concerned with new businesses of this sort and 
with the initial critical mass hurdle that they generally seem to face.  In a very 
general model, we show how this hurdle depends on the nature of network effects, 
the dynamics of customer behavior, and the distribution of customer tastes.  
Weak, plausible assumptions about adjustment processes imply that platforms 
must get a sufficient number of members of both sides on board to launch 
successfully. 
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1. Introduction   
Platform businesses add value by facilitating interaction of various sorts between customers who 
are attracted to the platform at least in part by network externalities. Such businesses are 
important in many key industries such as financial exchanges, advertising-supported media, and 
video-game consoles.  They are significant in many web-based businesses such as search, job 
boards, social networking, and e-commerce.4  Theory tells us that firms with substantial network 
effects may be able to grow rapidly from a small base, because customers attract more 
customers.  Some do.  MySpace grew to more than 2 million registered users in its first year.5  
But most do not.  Few of the numerous business-to-business exchanges that started in the late 
1990s survived despite beginning with an initial base of buyers and sellers.6  Many banks 
launched similar credit card systems in the 1950s, and almost all failed.7
 Consistent with this experience, we show here why an important class of new two-sided 
platform businesses, those for which the costs of reversing participation decisions are negligible, 
generally face a critical mass constraint that must be satisfied if the business is to be viable.  This 
constraint, which is two-dimensional for two-sided platforms, does not involve production scale 
economies or fixed costs.  We show that it depends instead on the nature of the network effects 
linking the platform’s two customer groups, the distribution of tastes among potential customers 
in both groups, and the nature of out-of-equilibrium dynamics.
   And, as we discuss 
below, many social networking sites have been started, but only a few grew explosively, and 
most, such as SixDegrees.com, the first such site, failed to become viable businesses.   
8
 Multi-sided platforms on which it is easy to reverse participation decisions have become 
increasingly important since the rise of the internet.  Users can readily reverse participation 
  Because our focus here is on the 
fundamental nature and sources of this constraint, we do not impose additional assumptions that 
would enable us to derive profit-maximizing price (and/or non-price) strategies. 
                                                 
4 For a general discussion of platform businesses see Evans and Schmalensee (2008). 
5 ComScore MediaMetrix Report, August 2004. 
6 See Lucking-Reiley and Spulber (2001).  
7 See Evans and Schmalensee (2005, ch. 3). 
8 We consider only regimes in which prices are not conditional on numbers of participants. Weyl (forthcoming) has 
shown that in a world of perfect information it is possible for a new platform to eliminate the critical mass constraint 
through an “insulating tariff” policy that makes the price of  (or subsidy for) participation a function of the 
participation of others.  Such policies do not seem to be common, however, and, as we discuss below we do not 
believe they are feasible for most new platform businesses. 
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decisions, for example, on social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and LinkedIn.9  
Many users, for example, switched from Friendster—one of the most popular early social 
networking sites—to MySpace as a result of dissatisfaction with Friendster and the appeal of 
MySpace.10  It is also easy to reverse participation decisions in many multi-sided platforms for 
which network effects are important.11  These include older platforms such as payment cards and 
newspapers as well as newer ones such as video-sharing sites (e.g., Veoh) and auction sites (e.g., 
eBay).12
 The formal analysis of businesses in which direct network effects make participation 
more attractive to each individual the more other individuals participate began with the seminal 
paper by Rohlfs (1974).  He assumed, as we do, that participants incur no costs when they 
change their participation status.  This assumption makes myopic customer behavior rational, 
and we assume myopic behavior in what follows.  Rohlfs (1974) showed how a critical mass 
constraint can arise for a single-sided platform business under this assumption.  The subsequent 
literature on direct network effects, however, has focused primarily on situations in which the 
decision to participate in a network can be treated as irreversible.
  Indeed, consumers often multi-home—participate on more than one competing 
platform—because of differentiation and despite indirect network effects.  
13
                                                 
9These businesses attract “users” who want to connect with each other. We treat that as the sort of direct network 
effect that has been considered for communications platforms, e.g., by Rohlfs (1974). It is also possible, as discussed 
in Evans (2009), to characterize these as indirect network effects as a result of asymmetries between senders and 
receivers of friendship requests, but that detail is not relevant to the analysis here. (Facebook was partly designed to 
help college students find dates—so the two sides were men and women, while MySpace initially attracted 
musicians and their fans.) These businesses then make money from these users by providing access to them to 
advertisers. There is a positive indirect network effect from the advertisers to the users. We ignore advertisers in 
what follows and focus only on the startup phase that involves the acquisitions of users through the exploitation of 
network effects.  
  Myopic behavior is irrational 
in these situations, and expectations of non-participants play a key role.  With strong network 
effects, new networks tend either to capture the entire market (e.g., Blu-Ray) or to fail 
completely (e.g., HD-DVD).  This literature has modeled the launch of new networks as an 
10 See Boyd and Ellison (2007).  
11 One can argue that it becomes harder for people to reverse participation decisions on social networking sites as 
they accumulate friends, but that is unlikely to be an issue during the startup phase on these sites. 
12 On payment cards, see Evans and Schmalensee (2005).  Evans and Schmalensee (2008) discuss numerous 
examples of two-sided platforms.  
13 See Katz and Shapiro (1994), Economides (1996), and Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for surveys of this mainly 
theoretical literature; Birke (2008) discusses related empirical work.  Recent studies of competition in markets with 
direct network effects include Economides et al (2005) and Cabral (2008).  The network games model of Jackson 
and Yariv (2007) is formally equivalent to a direct network effects model with zero costs of changing participation 
status. 
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event, not a process, and has examined competition among networks for dominance; it has not 
focused on the startup problems facing new networks or the dynamic process of network growth. 
 More recently, the groundbreaking work of Rochet and Tirole (2003) on “two-sided 
markets” has stimulated much theoretical work and an increasing amount of empirical work on 
multi-sided platform businesses that exploit indirect network effects between distinct customer 
groups.14
    As far as we know, the critical mass constraint facing new multi-sided platforms, on 
which this essay focuses, has not been addressed systematically in the previous literature.  The 
market microstructure literature occasionally alludes to the role of critical liquidity in 
establishing viable exchanges, but it contains no systematic analysis.
  Video game console firms, for example, realize network effects from people who buy 
their consoles and publishers who build games on their platforms. Informal discussions in this 
literature emphasize the need for platform businesses to “get both sides on board” and to “solve 
the chicken-and-egg problem.”  However, formal modeling has focused on characteristics of 
established, successful platforms, not on the launch of new platforms.   
15
 When it is launched, a typical platform start-up often uses venture funding to learn about 
demand and to attempt to build a viable business.
 Caillaud and Julien 
(2003) consider the launch of platforms that function as intermediaries; but they require that all 
customer decisions be made in a single period after prices are set, so that platform launch is 
treated as an event, not a process.  Hagiu (2006) studies a two-stage start-up game with full 
information, though he allows for the possibility that customers on the two sides of the business 
may make their decisions in different periods. The only previous study of which we are aware of 
that explores the dynamics of starting up a business with significant indirect network effects and 
negligible switching costs is Fath and Sarvary (2003), which considers a specialized model of 
buyer-side business-to-business exchanges. 
16
                                                 
14 Notable theoretical contributions include Ambrus and Argenziano (2009), Armstrong (2006), Caillaud and Julien 
(2003), Hagiu (2006), and Weyl (2008a, 2008b); see Rochet and Tirole (2006) for an overview.  Stremersch et al 
(2007) and Birke (2008) provide overviews of the empirical literature; see Argentesti and Filistrucchi (2007), 
Genakos and Valletti (2008), and Kaiser and Wright (2006) for recent contributions.  We resist the “two-sided 
market” terminology because two-sidedness is a characteristic of individual business models, not of markets.  We 
prefer the term “multi-sided platform” (Evans and Schmalensee (2008)) or “economic catalyst” (Evans and 
Schmalensee (2007)). 
  A variety of more or less expensive 
15 See Harris (2002) and O’Hara (1995) on this literature. 
16 See Evans (2009) for some case studies.  Since the distribution of tastes for new platforms’ offerings are generally 
unknown, one would expect the choice of startup policies generally to be liquidity constrained by investors, who 
5 
 
transitory devices are typically employed to build demand; these include low introductory prices, 
advertising, viral marketing, vendor-supplied content, and seeking marquee participants.  If 
consumer tastes turn out to be favorable and the critical mass constraint can be satisfied, the 
business can then turn its attention to maximizing long-run profits.  Our concern here is with the 
severity of this constraint, with how much must be done at the outset to make ultimate success 
possible, not with how it might best be satisfied.  Accordingly, we do not make restrictive 
assumptions that would enable us to consider optimal launch or post-launch price or non-price 
policies. 17
 In Section 2 we consider single-sided platform businesses in order to introduce notation 
and assumptions in a familiar setting and to relate our analysis to the previous literature.  We 
discuss social networking sites briefly in order to motivate the analysis. Then, building on Rholfs 
(1974), we show that for any given price and non-price policy, if a potentially viable business 
attains a critical mass of participants, network effects will drive subsequent growth until the 
business reaches a stable equilibrium.
 
18
 In Section 3 we turn our main concern, the analysis of the critical mass constraint facing 
businesses that offers a single platform to two distinct customer groups and rely on indirect 
network effects connecting them.
  If the business finds itself with less than this critical 
mass of participants, however, network effects will drive a downward spiral toward a stable 
equilibrium with zero participation.  For any given price and non-price policy, both the critical 
mass necessary for viability and the larger stable equilibrium participation depend on the 
distribution of consumer tastes.  While equilibrium participation is a decreasing function of the 
platform’s price, all else equal, as one would expect, critical mass is increasing in price. 
19
                                                                                                                                                             
might, for instance, reasonably refuse to fund widespread subsidies to participants on a platform that may ultimately 
be non-viable.  We believe that the uncertainty generally faced by both investors and potential customers leads to 
liquidity constraints that generally rule out use of the “insulating tariffs” discussed by Weyl (forthcoming). 
  To motivate the analysis we provide brief discussions of the 
experience of new two-sided platforms of two types: business-to-business (B2B) exchanges and 
17 Similarly, we do not address whether a platform that attains critical mass would in fact be profitable; this would 
require the explicit consideration of costs and other revenue. 
18 Economides and Himmelberg (1995) and Economides (1996) discuss “critical mass” in the context of direct 
network effects, but they do not explicitly consider the start-up problem, and their definition of “critical mass” is, as 
we demonstrate below, different from the quantity that emerges in the analysis of that problem. 
19 Ambrus and Arrgenziano (2009) present equilibria in a model with two consumer types in which a monopolist 
offers two networks with different pricing patterns.  These equilibria require substantial coordination among 
consumers, however, which seems absent in many markets.  But see Ruffle, Weiss, and Etziony (2010) for an 
interesting recent experimental study that finds buyer coordination in some circumstances. 
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payment systems.  We show that in general two-sided platforms face a two-dimensional critical 
mass constraint.  The shape of the critical mass frontier depends on the distribution of tastes 
within both groups as well as the relative speeds with which different sorts of disequilibria are 
eliminated.  Increases in prices or reductions in desirable non-price attributes tend to shift this 
frontier out while lowering the system’s higher stable equilibrium. 
 Section 4 provides some concluding observations and suggestions for further work.   
2. Direct Network Externalities 
 This section considers the dynamics of a platform business that hopes to exploit positive 
direct network effects within a single customer group.  For concreteness it is useful to think of a 
new social networking site. 
2.1 Social Networking Sites 
A number of such sites were started before the dot.com bust, but it does not appear that 
any have survived as significant entities. SixDegrees.com was one of the first.  It was an open 
social network that anyone could join, and it grew to about three million users over three years.20  
Participation reportedly fell off thereafter because there was not enough to do on the site.  In 
contrast, Facebook had over 50 million users after its first year as an open social network.21
Facebook was launched in February, 2004 at Harvard College as a virtual place where 
students who saw each other in class and other settings could connect and possibly find dates.  
According to one of its founders, Mark Zuckerberg, “[W]ithin two weeks, two-thirds of Harvard 
were using it.”
  
SixDegrees.com imploded, while Facebook and MySpace exploded. 
22  Facebook then launched similar closed social networks at other colleges. About 
85 percent of students in those colleges had accounts as of September 2005.23
                                                 
20 See Facebook, Case E220, Stanford Graduate School of Business, May 2006.  
  Within these 
closed communities Facebook appears to have had an easy time obtaining significant 
21 See Facebook Timeline (available at http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?timeline, last visited on March  23, 
2009). 
22 See Facebook, Case E220, Stanford Graduate School of Business, May 2006. 
23 See Yadav (2006). 
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participation quickly.  Facebook opened its network in September, 2006, and it had more than 
110 million users by October, 2008.24
MySpace took a different approach. It was established from the beginning as an open 
social network.  eUniverse, which operated a number of community-based websites, launched 
MySpace in August, 2003. To ignite the site it sent an email to its 250 employees describing 
MySpace and inviting them to join.  It also sponsored a contest with a prize of $1000 for the 
employee who attracted the largest number of friends.
 
25  The email said “If all 250 employees 
add 10 friends, we’ll have an instant base of 2500 and this will be the spark we need to jumpstart 
this service.”26 At the same time, it started inviting the 18.5 million users who visited its various 
other sites.  As of late September it was adding 4-6 thousand users a day.27  Early marketing 
efforts focused on rock bands from Los Angeles area. The bands set up group profiles and 
invited fans to “friend” them.28  Musicians, models, and their fans comprised many of the early 
users according to some accounts, and their presence continues to differentiate the site from its 
rivals today.  MySpace grew explosively from these beginnings.  It had 56 million users as of 
September, 2008.29
 Generally, entrepreneurs behind a social networking site want to secure a large group of 
consumers who will attract each other to visit the site regularly.  If they obtain enough users, 
advertisers will pay enough to reach these users to offset the costs of establishing and running the 
 
                                                 
24 See Facebook Timeline (available at http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?timeline, last visited on March  23, 
2008).and Facebook Statistics (available at http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics, last visited on March 
23, 2009). 
25 Here we draw mainly on Brad Greenspan’s narrative. See “MySpace History,” available at 
http://freemyspace.com/?q=node/13, last visited on June 10, 2008. For a somewhat different perspective that skips 
over the details of the MySpace launch see, for example, M. Bosworth, “What’s Inside MySpace.com? Murdoch’s 
Latest Media Marvel May Be His Biggest Yet”, April 8, 2005, available at 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2006/03/myspace_inside.html, last visited on June 10, 2008. 
26 A snapshot of the email is available at: http://freemyspace.com/08-28-03.JPG. 
27 http://freemyspace.com/M.jpg 
28 See “Indie Bands and Their Fans Flock to MySpace.com,” PR Newswire, 18 March 2004, available at 
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/summary_0199-148035_ITM, last visited on June 10, 2008. See also “Thousands 
of Bands, 2 Million Users Kick Off MySpace Music Site,” PR Newswire, 25 May 2004, available at 
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-384296/Thousands-of-Bands-2-Million.html, last visited on June 10, 2008.  
29 See compete.com, last visited on October 16, 2008. 
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site and generate a profit.  Facebook, for example, waited until it had 50 million users, 44 months 
(three and a half years) after its inception, before it started selling advertising.30
2.2 Assumptions 
   
 We now show how the distribution of consumer tastes can affect whether a social 
network experiences explosive growth like Facebook or a rapid decline into failure like most of 
its predecessors.  Let N(t) denote the number of individuals who participate on the platform at 
time t, and let N  be the maximum possible number of participants.  Consistent with most of the 
literature, we assume that the attractiveness of participating on the site under consideration does 
not depend on the identities of the other participants.   We assume that a typical individual, i, if 
she is well-informed, will want to participate on the site at time t if and only if 
(1)  ( )[ ] 0,i i iV N t Pα θ− − ≥  or  ( ) ( )1 .i i i iV P N tθ α−Ω ≡ + ≤  
Here the Vi  are increasing functions with Vi(0) = 0 and parameters αi.  These functions reflect 
differences among individuals in the attractiveness of being connected to others on the platform 
in question and thus reflect both individual- and site-specific attributes.  Similarly, θi measures 
the non-pecuniary costs to individual i of participation on the site, net of any intrinsic willingness 
to participate on the site even if nobody else does.  For an internet-based platform it will reflect 
ease of use as well as individual i’s reaction to such site-specific attributes as advertising, site 
design, and supplier-provided content.31
 We assume the non-negative quantity, Ω, which is a measure of the net resistance to 
participation, is distributed in the relevant population according to some smooth density function 
f (Ω|P), with corresponding non-decreasing distribution function F(Ω|P).  What matters for 
market dynamics is the behavior of F in the interval 
  The pecuniary cost of participating on this site is P, 
which we take as constant along with the Vi, αi, and θi.  Clearly increasing P will increase Ωi for 
all i.  Advertiser-supported sites usually have no fees so P = 0; non-price attributes such as site 
design and advertising intrusiveness affect the distribution of the Ωi. 
0, N   , which may or may not coincide with 
                                                 
30 See Facebook Factsheet, Press Release, available at http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?timeline, last visited 
on March 23, 2009. 
31 In some cases, increased participation might lower θ generally, if participants can add features or functionality to 
the platform. 
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its support.  On these assumptions, the number of individuals who, if they are well informed, will 
want to participate on the platform at time t is simply ( ) .F N t P N    When N(t) equals this 
quantity, we have a fulfilled expectations equilibrium. Because Ω is increasing in P from 
equation (1), it follows that F N P    is everywhere decreasing in P.  If the Vi and θi vary among 
individuals, the shape of F may also depend on the level of P. 
 The entire target population is almost never well-informed at the launch of a new web 
site – or, for that matter, any other new business or new product.   In the case of internet-based 
platforms, individuals who visit can learn about the features of the service and at least form a 
rough idea of the number of participants at that time.  But there are always many new sites, and 
visiting all of them would take an enormous amount of time and effort.  As with any new 
product, learning about platform businesses also takes place through word of mouth, and, 
perhaps, advertising.  For our purposes, it suffices to assume only that N(t) always tends 
smoothly toward its well-informed equilibrium: 
(2)   { } ( ) ( ){ }sgn sgn .dNN F N t P N N tdt≡ =   −   
 This assumption is consistent with an extensive body of empirical work, much of it in 
marketing, on the launch of new products.32  The product diffusion models employed there 
assume, as we do here, that demand adjusts gradually toward equilibrium over time because of 
imperfect information and inertia.33
2.3 The Critical Mass Problem 
    
Figure 1 illustrates how, with price fixed, the dynamics of this model depend on the 
distribution of Ω in the population of potential participants. From (2), if ( )F N P N  is above the 
45-degree line OT, N is increasing; otherwise it is decreasing.  If Ω is distributed according to 1F  
for some post-initiation price, few in the population have low values of Ω, the origin is the only 
                                                 
32 The seminal paper is Bass (1969). For a survey of the subsequent literature through the late 1980s see Manajan et al 
(1990).  
33 We thus rule out the sort of coordinated behavior considered by Ambrus and Argenziano (2009) and studied 
experimentally by Ruffle, Weiss, and Etziiony (2010).  Our treatment of dynamics generalizes that of Fath and 
Sarvary (2003).  The model of this section is formally close to the network game model of Jackson and Yariv 
(2007). 
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equilibrium, and it is globally stable.  This platform cannot be made successful at the level of P 
that underlies F1which may be zero for an advertiser-supported website no matter what 
value of N is attained initially.  At the other extreme, if Ω is distributed according to 2 ,F  which 
corresponds to a monotonically decreasing density function, the corresponding business will 
reach point G even if the site starts with a value of N near zero.  The origin is still an equilibrium 
in this case, but an unstable one.  All that is necessary to launch this business is somehow to 
make N positive – perhaps by signing up the firm’s founders as users.  Doing so will ignite a 
catalytic reaction that will drive the network to its globally stable equilibrium at point G.  As 
discussed above, Facebook may be an example of this within the closed college networks with 
which it began.   
**Figure 1** 
 The most interesting case is illustrated by 3F in Figure 1, which corresponds to a 
unimodal distribution of Ω with mode between zero and .N   In this case there are two locally 
stable equilibria: the origin and point E.34  In order to reach E, however, the business needs 
somehow to attain critical mass, to get participation beyond the unstable equilibrium at point C.35
2 ,F
  
Even though the potential scale of this platform is nearly as great as that of the platform 
corresponding to  realization of that potential would require a much more serious initial 
launch effort.  Note that in this case if P > 0, lowering P would raise F3 and thus move the stable 
equilibrium point E to the right and the point C, which defines the critical mass constraint, to the 
left.36  (If this is an advertiser-supported site with P = 0, however, this tactic may not be 
available if the platform faces liquidity constraints.37
                                                 
34 It is easy to see that if there are multiple equilibria in this model, stage and unstable equilibria alternate. 
)  Following Jackson and Yariv (2007), any 
35 Rohlfs (1974), Economides and Himmelberg (1995), and Economides (1996) discuss cases similar to this one, and 
they note the existence of an unstable equilibrium, but they do not relate it to the requirements for successful 
platform launch.  Jackson and Yariv (2007) discuss formally identical cases in the context of network games. 
36 Economides and Himmelberg (1995) and Economides (1996) define “critical mass” in this context as the smallest 
possible stable equilibrium.  In Figure 1, price increases would lower F3 until it becomes tangent to the dotted OT 
line.  These authors define “critical mass” as the value of N corresponding to the point of tangency; it gives the 
smallest possible stable equilibrium with positive participation.  But this is only the scale that must be attained at 
launch by the network with the highest possible price.  Networks with lower prices have lower critical mass 
requirements. 
37 More generally, one could imagine a launch strategy in which P (or, in the two-sided case, the price structure) is 
initially set low enough to induce increasing participation even with a very small initial N and then lowered over 
time as increases in N make the platform more attractive.  Gabszewicz and Garcia (2005) consider strategies of this 
sort.  Such strategies do not seem common in practice, however, perhaps because if θ is generally positive they 
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change in the attributes of the platform or the tastes of potential consumers that has the effect of 
raising F3 (so that the old distribution of Ω first-order stochastically dominates the new one) will 
have this same effect. 
 If the origin is a locally stable equilibrium for given price and non-price policies, a 
single-sided platform must reach positive critical mass in order to reach a higher stable 
equilibrium.  A necessary and sufficient condition for any equilibrium point n to be locally stable 
is  
(3)    ( ) 1.f n P N <  
 To understand (3), consider increasing actual participation from n to n+δ, where δ is small.  The 
corresponding increase in equilibrium participation induced by direct network effects is 
( ) .f n P Nδ   Condition (3) then requires that network effects be locally weak enough that the 
increase in equilibrium participation is less than the increase in actual participation, so that actual 
participation will fall back toward the initial equilibrium.  Conversely, condition (3) is violated at 
equilibria at which network effects are locally strong, and this leads to instability. 
 Focusing on the origin (n = 0), condition (3) says that some initial launch effort is 
required because the number of eager early adopters (those with very low Ωs) is insufficient to 
ignite growth to a viable equilibrium level.  This seems consistent with the experience of many 
new platforms.  Distribution function 3F  in Figure 1 also satisfies the following condition, which 
ensures the existence of at least one non-zero, locally stable equilibrium: 
(4)    ( )
0,
max 0.
x N
F x P N x
 ∈ 
 − >   
   Following Rohlfs (1974, Sect. 3), it is instructive briefly to consider the following 
specialization of equation (1):   
(5)   0, .i i
i
PN P or Nα α− ≥ Ω ≡ ≤  
                                                                                                                                                             
require the new venture to pay participants.  Venture capitalists and other early-stage investors in ventures with 
uncertain demand, as well as self-funded entrepreneurs, seem likely to resist financing such payments; larger 
companies that are launching platforms as separate product lines may be more likely to provide subsidies to spark 
growth. 
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where α is uniformly distributed in the population of potential participants from zero to A.  (To 
transform this into a model of an advertiser supported site, set P = 0 and assume a constant θ > 0 
for all potential participants.)  It is easy to show that the distribution of Ω is then given by 
(6)   ( )
( )
0,
.
1 ,
Pfor AF
P PforA A
 Ω ≤Ω = 
− Ω ≥ Ω
 
 For fixed P, equilibrium at a positive N requires 
(7a)  ( ) 1 ,PN F N N NNA = = −   or  1 ,
pµ µ= −  where 
(7b)   ,N
N
µ ≡  and .Pp
AN
≡  
If p exceeds ¼, equation (7a) has no real roots.  For p < ¼, this equation has two real roots, on 
opposite sides of μ = ½:    
(8)    ( )
1
21 1 1 4 .
2
pµ  = ± −  
 
**Figure 2** 
 Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of this example when p < ¼.  The origin and point E, 
which corresponds to the larger solution to (8), are locally stable, while the point C, which 
corresponds to the smaller solution, is the unstable critical mass point.  In order for the positive 
network externality to build participation up to point E, the platform needs to attract initial 
participation at least corresponding to C. 
3. Indirect Network Effects 
 We now turn to the main focus of this essay: the more complex and interesting dynamics 
of a new platform business that aims to harness indirect network effects between two customer 
groups.  We first consider the instructive experiences of business-to-business exchanges and 
payment systems and then develop a general model that builds on that presented in Section 2. 
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3.1 Business to Business Exchanges 
  More than 1500 business-to-business exchanges were started between 1995 and 2001.38 
Virtually all of them imploded in the early 2000s, and the notable ones that survived, such as 
Ariba, shifted focus from facilitating bilateral buyer-seller transactions. These sites failed in part 
because they could not attract enough suppliers. As one consultant noted about the proposed 
B2B exchanges for the airline industry:39
[suppliers] continue to be reluctant to sign up to portals and other e-mechanisms 
created by the prime contractors.  The key reason for this is that the primary 
objective of e-procurement is perceived to be a reduction in the purchase price, 
therefore forcing pressures on [supplier] margins.  
 
A number of observers of the demise of the B2Bs opined that a major problem was that suppliers 
were scared, as one put it, “of comparison shopping and brand dilution.”40
 Dell Marketplace, which opened in late 2000, is an example of a B2B exchange that 
failed to reach critical mass. Unlike some electronic marketplaces that focused on e-procurement 
in specific vertical markets, Dell Marketplace was designed to reach horizontally across multiple 
product segments to provide buyers access to items from a variety of suppliers.
  Buyers did not 
necessarily find the sites attractive either. Sophisticated ones had considerable knowledge about 
the quality of suppliers and did not find auction methods of procurement attractive.  Thus there 
were too few interested buyers and sellers to make viable markets.  
41  Customers 
could buy Dell personal computers, notebooks, servers and related hardware, along with other 
office products from selected suppliers. However, less than a year after its ambitious launch, Dell 
Marketplace closed in February, 2001. As explained by Dell, the exchange closed down due to 
"a limited readiness of customers to make use of an electronic marketplace."42
                                                 
38  Harrington (2001). 
 Lack of interest 
39 See, Odell (2001). 
40 See Nowshade Kabir, “E-marketplace; Facts and Fictions,” WebProNews, posted on August 20th, 2003, 
http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2003/08/20/emarketplace-facts-and-fictions. 
41 See Bochner (2000).  
42 See Mahoney (2001). 
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from customers was not the only problem, though: only three suppliers signed up to sell their 
products directly to customers in the four months Dell Marketplace was open.43
3.2 Payment Card Systems 
  
The modern payment card industry was started in the 1950s.44  Diners Club launched the 
first successful network for consumers and merchants in 1950.  It took a sequential geographic 
and segment approach beginning with New York City restaurants. To ignite the business it 
signed up 14 restaurants and a few hundred cardholders in Manhattan. The restaurants were 
charged seven percent of the meal tab. The cardholders paid no fixed or variable fees for the 
cards and, since they only had to pay their bills once a month, enjoyed free float for an average 
of about two weeks. Thus cardholders initially faced a negative price for using the card. 
According to press reports Diners Club increased the number of cardholders to 42,000 and 
number of merchants to 330 in a year. It expanded to other cities and to other travel-and-
entertainment segments.  By 1956, almost $54 million of transactions had taken place 
nationally.45
It appears that the ability to use payment cards in a wide geographic area was important 
to a substantial number of consumers.  One bank tried to start a card network before Diners Club, 
and hundreds attempted afterwards.  At the time, interstate banking restrictions limited most 
banks to operate solely within single states, and branch banking restrictions sometimes limited 
banks to operate solely within single communities.  Despite easy access to consumers and 
merchants—both already bank customers—banks’ attempts to launch payment cards failed. It 
appears that Bank of America was the only successful bank entrant.  It launched a card network 
that covered California; this large network eventually evolved into the Visa card association. 
  
 3.3 Assumptions 
 For concreteness, in what follows we employ the now-familiar example of content-
sharing platforms.  In these platforms some individuals upload content such as videos, photos, or 
news stories while others download that content and view it. 46
                                                 
43 See Weiss (2001). 
   The uploaders value the 
44 For support for this section, see Evans and Schmalensee (2007, ch. 1) and Evans and Schmalensee (2005,  ch .3). 
45 See Evans and Schmalensee (2005), pp 1-3.   
46 For an interesting discussion of YouTube’s efforts to attract a critical mass of uploaded content and viewers and 
the explosive growth that occurred when it did so, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nssfmTo7SZg. 
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popularity and reputation-building that come from attracting a large audience, while the 
downloaders value having a larger pool of content to choose from.  Such platforms typically 
operate like media business sites in that they acquire viewers and then sell access to these 
viewers to advertisers. 
 Let NU(t) and ND(t), respectively, denote the number of individuals who regularly upload 
and download content at time t, and let 
U
N and ,
D
N  respectively, denote the maximum number 
of potential regular uploaders and downloaders.  Note that some individuals may participate both 
as uploaders and as downloaders. It is then appropriate to consider them as on both sides of the 
platform. Since downloaders are generally interested in new content, they will, if well informed, 
visit a site regularly only if new content is regularly uploaded, while uploaders, who want their 
work to be seen, will have no audience and thus no incentive to upload if downloaders do not 
visit regularly.  We continue to assume that participation decisions are easily reversible and that 
only the number of participants on each side matters, not their identities. 
 In parallel with the development in Section 2, we assume that a typical individual i, if he 
is well informed, will want to be a regular downloader at time t if 
(9) ( ) 0,D U D D Di i iV N t Pα θ  − − ≥   or    ( ) ( )1 .D D D D D Ui i i iV P N tθ α−Ω ≡ + ≤  
This is just equation (1) applied to a potential downloaders, except that the network effect here is 
indirect: downloaders care about the participation of uploaders, not the participation of other 
downloaders.   
  As in Section 2, we assume that the quantity ,DiΩ which measures resistance to 
participation as a downloader, is distributed in the population according to the smooth density 
function f D(Ω|PD), with corresponding distribution function FD(Ω|PD).  Then the number of 
households who, if they are well informed, will want to be regular downloaders at time t is 
simply ( ) DD U DF N t P N   .  F
D is non-increasing in PD, and we assume that imperfect 
information and inertia yield gradual adjustment of downloading toward its well-informed 
equilibrium at each instant: 
(10)   { } ( ) ( ){ }sgn sgn .DD D U D DN F N t P N N t = −    
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 We make qualitatively identical assumptions on the other side of the market.  Thus 
individual j, if she is well informed, will want to be an uploader at time t if 
(11) ( ) 0,U D U U Uj j jV N t Pα θ  − − ≥     or    ( ) ( )1 .U U U U U Dj j j jV P N tθ α−Ω ≡ + ≤  
We assume that  ,UjΩ which measures resistance to participation as an uploader, is distributed in 
the population according to the smooth density function f U(Ω|PU), with corresponding 
distribution function FU(Ω|PU), so that the number of households who will want to be regular 
uploaders at time t if they are well informed is simply ( ) UU D UF N t P N   .  For advertiser-
supported content-sharing sites, PU = 0.  As above, we simply assume gradual adjustment of 
uploaders toward their well-informed equilibrium: 
(12)   { } ( ) ( ){ }sgn sgn .UU U D U UN F N t P N N t = −   
3.4 The Two-Dimensional Critical Mass Problem 
Three cases that correspond broadly to the three distribution functions illustrated in 
Figure 1 can be instructively analyzed graphically here.  (As in Section 2, the shape of each of 
the curves considered here as well as its level may in general depend on the corresponding 
price.)  Figure 3 shows a two-sided platform business that is not viable at the prices chosen, no 
matter how it is launched, because there are too few individuals on either side of the market with 
low values of Ω.  The directions of motion over time implied by (10) and (12) are indicated by 
the short arrows, while the curved arrows show, qualitatively, typical trajectories.  The origin is 
the only equilibrium, and it is globally stable.47
**Figure 3** 
  Even if this system were launched with 
substantial uploading activity, as at point A, uploading would tend monotonically to zero, while 
after an initial increasing phase, downloading would also decline to zero. 
                                                 
47 For simplicity, Figure 3 is drawn with fU(0) and fD(0) positive.  If, instead, FU (FD) were zero in a neighborhood of 
zero, the 0UN =  ( 0DN = ) locus would intersect the vertical axis above the origin (the horizontal axis to the right 
of the origin), and the origin would still be the only stable equilibrium. 
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 Figure 4 illustrates a case in which at the prices chosen there are many individuals with 
low resistance to uploading and many with low resistance to downloading.48
2F
  The intersection 
point G is a globally stable equilibrium.  (If the curves were to hit the dashed lines before they 
intersected, the point T, with universal participation, would be the unique stable equilibrium.)  In 
this case, as in the case of the  distribution in Figure 1, all that is necessary to reach a 
trajectory tending toward the stable equilibrium at G is to move the system an arbitrarily small 
distance away from the origin—by uploading a single video, for example. 
**Figure 4** 
 We suspect that the case illustrated in Figure 3 is very common, simply because lots of 
ideas for content-sharing and other platforms simply are not attractive enough to one or both 
sides of the market to be viable at prices that cover cost, no matter how they are launched.  On 
the other hand, the apparent fact that very few successful two-sided platform businesses have 
been launched with essentially no effort i.e., no initial investment in attracting a non-zero 
critical mass on at least one side of the marketsuggests that the case illustrated in Figure 4 is 
very uncommon.  The chicken-and-egg problem rarely seems to be trivial for real platforms. 
 Thus we suspect that most two-sided platforms that were ultimately successfulas well 
as more than a few that could have been successful if properly launched but that ultimately failed 
have post-launch dynamics like those illustrated in Figure 5.  The shapes of the two 
distribution functions illustrated correspond to unimodal density functions of ΩU and ΩD, with 
modes occurring before universal participation.49  The origin and point E are locally stable 
equilibria,50
                                                 
48 As Figure 4 is drawn, the origin is not an equilibrium.  It would be an unstable equilibrium if the two stationary 
curves intersected there 
 while point C is a saddle-point.  (As in Figure 4, if the curves do not intersect to the 
right of C, the universal participation point, T, is the non-zero locally stable equilibrium.)  That 
is, there is a unique critical trajectory, like AA' or BB', that tends toward C.  Trajectories 
beginning above this trajectory tend to E, while trajectories beginning below this path tend to the 
origin.   
49 To see this, note that the slope of the 0DN = locus, for instance, is equal to ( )
DD Uf N N . 
50 If there are multiple equilibria with positive N’s, it is easy to see that locally stable equilibria and saddle-points 
must alternate.  This same pattern appears in the two-sided search literature—see, e.g., Burdett and Wright (1998)—
for broadly similar reasons.  We are indebted to Andrei Shevchenko for calling this to our attention. 
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**Figure 5** 
 The need to reach a point above this critical trajectory in order for positive feedback to 
drive the system to the point E rather than to the origin is the critical mass constraint for two-
sided platforms.51
 We believe that frontiers like AA' are the normal case.
  If the critical trajectory looks like BB' the platform’s critical mass constraint 
is essentially one-dimensional: it requires securing either enough chickens or enough eggs, to 
use the familiar metaphor.  If, on the other hand, the critical trajectory looks like AA', the 
platform’s critical mass constraint is two-dimensional: it requires securing both enough chickens 
and enough eggs.   
52
 In general, an increase in PD (or any change in site characteristics or downloaders’ tastes 
that results in a shift to a new ΩD distribution that stochastically dominates the old) would shift 
the 
  Frontiers with shapes like AA' 
arise when the side of the market with participation above its well-informed equilibrium level 
adjusts downward faster than the other side, which has participation below its equilibrium level, 
adjusts upward.  If a potential downloader, say, visits a video-sharing site and finds no content of 
interest, she can instantly decide not to participate – i.e., not to visit the site again, at least for 
some period of time.  On the other side of the market, it is likely to take time for information 
regarding the number of regular downloaders – i.e., the size of the audience for video content – 
to diffuse among potential uploaders and for them to decide to begin uploading content.   
0DN = curve down, thus moving the point C, and with it the system’s critical trajectory, 
away from the origin, while shifting the stable equilibrium point E toward the origin.  If both 
densities (and thus the slopes of both curves) are strictly positive at these points, both N’s would 
be increased at positive saddle-points, and both would be decreased at stable equilibria.  Raising 
PU or otherwise reducing the attractiveness of the audience of downloaders would shift the 
0UN = curve to the left and thus have qualitatively similar effects.  Resistance to participation 
on both sides of a two-sided platform can often be reduced significantly by platform design, 
                                                 
51 Fath and Sarvary (2003) show the existence of a constraint of this sort for their specialized model of buyer-side 
business-to-business exchanges. 
52 See Evans (2009) for more on this point and its implications. 
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particularly on the internet,53
 The condition that the origin be a stable equilibrium as in Figures 3 and 5 is that the 
 and it is interesting to note that such reductions both enhance the 
size of a successfully launched platform and relax the critical mass constraint that it must satisfy. 
0UN =  curve lie above the 0DN = curve in a neighborhood of the origin.  From (10) and (12), 
with smooth density functions this is equivalent to54
(13a)  
  
(0) (0) 0,D UF F and= =   
(13b)  ( ) ( ) 1 0.D UD U U D U Df n N f n N at n n    < = =        
 Condition (13b) is necessary and sufficient for any non-zero (nU,nD) equilibrium point to 
be stable.  Generalizing the discussion of condition (3) above, consider small increases δU and δD 
in actual participation from such a point.  The increases in equilibrium participation that would 
be induced by indirect network effect are 
   ( ) UU U D Dd f n N δ≡  and ( ) ,DD D U Ud f n N δ≡   
respectively.  Condition (13b) says that local network effects, as measured by the geometric 
mean of the two cross-effects, must be weak enough that dUdD <  δUδD:  the new equilibrium 
point lies on a rectangular hyperbola strictly below the new actual point, so that actual 
participation must decline on average.  Conversely, strong (geometric) average local network 
effects lead to saddle-point instability.  At the origin, condition (13b) requires that the numbers 
of potential uploaders and downloaders with very low resistance is low enough that some initial 
effort is necessary to launch the platform successfully. 
 The condition that there exist at least one non-zero stable equilibrium, as in Figures 4 and 
5, is that the 0UN = curve lie below the 0DN = curve somewhere in the relevant range, or 
(14)   ( ) ( ){ }1
0,
max / 0.
U
D UD U
x N
F x N F x N−
 ∈  
− >   
                                                 
53 The discussion of the role of the Flash media player in YouTube’s launch at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nssfmTo7SZg illustrates this point nicely. 
54 See Weyl (2008) for similar stability conditions.  We have not shown dependence on prices here and below to 
reduce notational clutter. 
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Clearly this condition will not be satisfied for all possible two-sided platforms, though it must be 
satisfied for all that are ultimately successful. 
 Finally, it is instructive to consider a two-sided version of the example analyzed in 
Section 2.  Suppose a typical individual i participates as an uploader (H=U) or downloader 
(H=D) if and only if 
(15)  0, , , , ; ,
HH K H H K
Hi i
i
PN P or N H K U D H Kα
α
− ≥ Ω ≡ ≤ = ≠  
where αH is distributed uniformly between 0 and AH, for H = U,D.  The two distributions of Ω 
are then given by 
(16)  ( )
( )
0,
, , .
1 ,
HH
H
H H
H HH
H H H
Pfor AF H U D
P PforA A
 Ω ≤
Ω = =
 − Ω ≥
Ω
 
 Equilibrium at positive NU and ND requires 
(17a) ( ) 1 , 1 ,
HH HHH H K H
H K K
pPN F N N N or whereA N µ µ
 = = − = −  
 
(17b)  , , , , ; .
H HH H
H KH
N Pand p H K U D H K
N A N
µ ≡ ≡ = ≠  
Note that each price is now normalized by the maximum participation on the other side of the 
market, since own price and other-side participation determine resistance.  Solving equations 
(17a) yields 
(18a)  1 1 , , , ; ,
2
H K Hp p T for H K U D H D whereµ  = + − ± = ≠   
(18b)   ( ) ( )21 2 .U D U DT p p p p= + − − +  
 In the single-sided example in Section 2, we needed p ≤ ¼ for non-negative demand, 
while in this case, (pU, pD) must lie on or below a convex frontier that passes through (1,0), (¼,  
¼), and (0,1) in order for T to be non-negative. In the single-sided example, the two roots were 
on opposite sides of μ = ½, while here it follows from (18a) that this is true for the average of the 
two μs:  
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(19)    1 .
2 2 2
U D Tµ µ+
= ±  
**Figure 6** 
 Figure (6) illustrates the dynamics of this example.  The origin and the point E, which 
corresponds to the larger solution to (19a), are locally stable, while the point C, which 
corresponds to the smaller solution, is the saddle-point to which the critical trajectory AA' tends.  
That trajectory defines the critical mass constraint that must be satisfied at start-up.  It follows 
directly from (18a) that at either C or E,  
(20)        .U D D Up pµ µ− = −  
Straightforward differentiation of (18b) demonstrates that as long as T is strictly positive, both μs 
at the stable equilibrium, E, are decreasing functions of both ps, while at the saddle-point, C, 
both μs are increasing functions of both ps. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 We have shown that when participation decisions are easily reversible, platform 
businesses, which rely on direct or indirect network effects to attract customers, confront 
demand-side constraints when they are launched that other businesses do not.  On the one hand, 
as the histories of such businesses as American Express charge cards, eBay’s auction platform 
and Facebook’s social networking platform illustrate, some platforms have been able to harness 
network effects to fuel truly explosive growth.  On the other hand, we have shown here why 
even without fixed costs or economies of scale, platform businesses typically need to attain 
critical mass when they are launched in order even to survive.  This may be an easy requirement 
or a difficult one, depending on the distribution of consumer tastes and the dynamics of 
adjustment to equilibrium.   
 In the case of direct network effects, the basic problem is that the level of participation on 
the platform affects the quality of the product it offers to participants, and if quality is too low, 
participation falls, which reduces quality further, and participation declines toward zero.  In the 
case of indirect network effects, which is our primary concern, participation by each customer 
group affects the quality of the product experienced by the other group, and, though the 
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dynamics are more complicated, participation levels below critical mass will set off a similar 
downward spiral.  Whether this is a chicken-and-egg or a chicken-or-egg problem depends on 
whether participation adjusts more rapidly downward toward equilibrium or upward. 
 There is much more work to be done on the launch of platform businesses, particularly 
multi-sided platforms.  Empirical work that would justify imposing particular restrictions on 
taste distributions and disequilibrium dynamics would permit the analysis of optimal price 
policies.  The analysis of optimal non-price policies would be more challenging but potentially at 
least as important. 
A natural next step would be to study the effects of competition with incumbent 
platforms and/or other new entrants on the startup dynamics of platform businesses.  Because of 
their growing importance and the complexity of their strategies, multi-sided platforms are likely 
to be an important subject of antitrust scrutiny, as discussed in Evans and Schmalensee (2008).  
Since new platform businesses face particular difficulties at launch, strategies for deterring their 
entry by denying them critical mass seem likely to be particularly attractive privately attractive 
and harmful socially.  The role of exclusivity restrictions and related strategies would seem to be 
especially worth investigating.   
 Another natural next step would be to relax our assumption that there are zero costs of 
reversing participation decisions.55
                                                 
55 Fath and Sarvary (2003) provide an interesting anal ysis of switching costs in their model of buyer-side business-
to-business exchanges. 
  Much of the previous literature on network effects has made 
the opposite extreme assumption, that participation or adoption decisions are irreversible, and 
has focused on the adoption of standards and the possibility of tipping into inefficient standards.  
We suspect that the importance of tipping, which results when one network attains a marginal 
lead that becomes an unstoppable competitive advantage, has been overstated, in part because of 
the literature’s general assumption that switching costs make participation decisions irreversible.  
Our sense is that participation is not irreversible in most markets and poor outcomes more 
commonly reflect the difficulty of getting efficient platforms to critical mass at all.  While our 
analysis does not preclude the possibility that inefficient platforms become established through 
tipping, it does suggest that success or failure may depend most importantly on both the value 
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that the platform brings to participants as well as the steps that platform entrepreneurs take early 
on to push adoption past the critical mass frontier. 
 Finally, as Evans (2009) and the brief case studies herein indicate, a variety of tactics 
have been employed during the launch of platform businesses.  But while case studies do suggest 
some common themesincluding the continuing prevalence of very different markups over 
marginal cost on the two sidesvery little rigorous empirical work has been done on the launch 
of platform businesses.  Both the histories of successful platforms and the analysis here suggest 
that such work could yield very interesting results that would enrich theory and inform both 
business strategy and public policy. 
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Figure 1.  Critical Mass and Equilibria for Platforms with Direct Network  Effects 
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Figure 2.  An Example of Critical Mass and Equilibria with Direct Network Effects 
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Figure 3.  A Non-Viable Two-Sided Platform 
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Figure 4.  A Viable Two-Sided Platform 
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Figure 5.  A Potentially Viable Two-Sided Platform 
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Figure 6.  An Indirect Network Effects Example 
